3 communistic and socialistic schemes-it is far from being the case that economic considerations hold the field exclusively. Account must also be taken of ethical, social, and political considerations that lie outside sphere of political economy regarded as a science. (p. 34) Thus, it would be generally agreed that, in dealing with practical questions, an abstract method of treatment avails less and carries us much less far than when we are dealing with theoretical questions. In other words, in dealing with the former class of questions, we are to a greater extent dependent upon history and inductive generalization. (p. 63) We are, accordingly, led to the conclusion…that a definitive art of political economy, which attempts to lay down absolute rules for the regulation of human conduct, will have vaguely defined limits, and be largely non-economic in character. (p. 83) The methodology of applied policy for Keynes was quite different from the methodology he saw for positive economics. It was inductive, relying on history and educated common sense. Pure theory-positive economics--was used by Keynes as a backdrop for thinking about policy problems, useful to help organize one's thoughts, but not to be applied to real-world problems. For Keynes, questions about the role of the state belonged in the art of economics; such questions could only be answered by addressing issues that went far beyond economic theory.
Answers about the role of the state were to be found in a broader philosophical tradition of liberalism. Such policy questions would be decided on economic, moral, 3
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From Muddling Through to Control 4 practical, political, and social grounds. Economists in their role as individuals or as social philosophers might have something to say about such questions, but in their role as economic theorists they had little to say because in that role they did not consider the noneconomic aspects of the questions. Economics was an input into policy; it did not come to policy conclusions.
In distinguishing between implications that could be drawn from positive theory and implications that could be drawn from the art branch of economics, Keynes distinguished theorems from precepts. A theorem was a conclusion that followed from positive economic theory; it concerned the way the economy worked. It did not concern policy questions dealing with the role of the state. A precept was a rule of thumb that concerned policy; it followed from the art of economics and was not derived from economic theory, but instead from introspection, induction, and an educated common sense. Pure theory (positive economics) played a role in developing that educated common sense because it revealed logical errors in initial common sense reasoning, but otherwise theory was not involved in determining policy or the role of the state. There could be precepts about the role of the state, but there would be no theorems about the role of the state. For Keynes, and for Classical economists more generally, the doctrine of laissez faire was a precept, not a theorem.
The "precept/theorem" "art/positive/normative" distinctions did not leave much of a role for pure economic theory in guiding economic policy. In terms of the then raging methodenstreit between those favoring an analytic approach, and those favoring an historical approach to economics, Keynes's solution gave applied policy to the historicists, and gave the scientific branch of economics-positive theory-to the Of course an economist retains the liberty, common to all the world, of expressing his opinion that a certain course of action is the right one under given circumstances; and if the difficulties of the problem are chiefly economic, he may speak with a certain authority. But on the whole, though the matter is one on which opinions differ, it seems best that he should do so rather in his private capacity, than as claiming to speak with the authority of economic science. (Marshall, 1898, Vol. II, pg. 154) While such careful prescriptions about drawing policy implications from theory may seem to be similar to Keynes', there was a major difference between their views. For
Marshall, positive theory was a tool of applied policy; it was a working abstraction, a tool, not a truth. 8 Since theory was only a tool, it was not a problem if one's theoretical apparatus incorporated some normative judgments and institutional realities as long as those value judgments were recognized, and were useful in making the theory more applicable. As a tool, theory did not have to be pure; it simply had to be useful.
One can best see Marshall's approach to theory through the tools he devised.
Consider the concept of consumer surplus, which Marshall developed as a theoretical tool useful in shedding light on some policy questions. It integrated all individuals' welfare into an area under a curve, and thereby included the implicit value judgment that individual's welfare was comparable and interchangeable. As a tool of pure science, the models built on that assumption were useless, but as a tool of a practicing economist, the models could be useful in certain instances, as long as when one applied the analysis one carefully considered the limiting assumptions upon which the analysis was built.
From Muddling Through to Control 8 Marshall carefully limited the application of his tools to applications for which he thought they fit. For example, consider his view of utility and tastes. He specifically rejects Jevons' and Menger's view that economics should be seen as the science of meeting given wants, and argues that our wants are not independent. He writes that "while wants are the rulers of life among the lower animals, it is to changes in the forms of efforts and activities that we must turn when in search for the keynotes of the history of mankind." (Marshall, 1890, p. 85 ) He further writes: "The higher study of consumption must come after, and not before, the main body of economic analysis; and, though it may have its beginning within the proper domain of economics, it cannot find its conclusion there, but must extend far beyond." (Marshall, 1890, pp. 90-91) For Marshall economic reasoning was an input into a broader policy analysis, and economic theory was an input into economic reasoning that is designed for the policy problem at hand. The difference between Keynes and Marshall is that for Keynes, theory is a deductive set of propositions involving long deductive chains of reasoning from initial assumptions. It is as pure as possible and avoids as many value judgments as possible. Modern general equilibrium theory would be an example of Keynes' pure theory. Theory, for Marshall, was makeshift; it specifically did not involve long deductive chains of arguments, but instead involved short chains of arguments, consistent with his "one thing at a time" approach. Its structure was determined by the policy problem one was addressing, and one would make generally accepted normative assumptions that fit the problem at hand in order to make the theory more useful. For
Marshall it was acceptable to integrate value judgments into the theory as long as those 8 8/16/04
From Muddling Through to Control 9 value judgments were clearly expressed, and if one took them into account when drawing on theory to arrive at a policy conclusion.
Pigou's Realistic Economics
A. C. Pigou followed Marshall at Cambridge and set the tone for applied economics that was used in the 1920s and 1930s. While mindful of Keynes's distinction between art and science, Pigou followed Marshall in developing economic theory as a sub-branch of the art of economics rather than as a logical deductive science. Pigou, however, is much clearer than Marshall about his method, and he specifically states that he is not doing pure theory, but is instead doing what he called realistic theory. He writes: "Hence it must be the realistic, not the pure, type of science that constitutes the object of our search." (Pigou, 1920, p. 6) To make this point even clearer, Pigou distinguishes between fruit-bearing theory and light-bearing theory (Pigou, 1920. p. 3) Fruit-bearing theory-realistic theory--is a branch of the art of economics; it is theory that is designed to solve particular policy problems. Light-bearing theory is pure theory, or theory belonging in Keynes' positive branch of economics.
As was the case with Marshall, Pigou has nothing to say about pure theory, which was what Keynes meant by positive economics; it simply wasn't part of Pigou's approach. Pigou's welfare economics must be seen in this light; it was not meant to be a final guide to policy. It was about precepts, not theorems. But, unlike Keynes, whose precepts were largely determined outside of economic theory, Pigou's precepts were developed within his realistic theory that embodied generally accepted value judgments. 9 8/16/04
Since his realistic theory was a tool of the art of economics, the absence of any normative welfare judgments, and the consistency of the analysis among different applications, was far less important than was it was for Keynes. As was the case with Marshall, Pigou normally accepted that normative judgments could be built into theory, as long as one was clear about what those judgments were, and did not argue that who disagreed with those value judgments were incorrect based on economic reasoning.
Economic theory was a set of tools, not rules, for policy makers.
The approach Pigou took to utility theory was consistent with this policy approach. He specifically did not use the term "utility" but instead used the term "desiredness." (Pigou, 1920 . p 23) Desiredness was determinable by introspection, and was comparable across averages of individuals. 9 For Pigou, desiredness was not a precise measure of a consumer's welfare, but simply a rough measure for his material welfare to be used when thinking about policy issues, and in explaining the results of economic analysis to others.
Since the tools were designed to come to a policy conclusion, the embodied value judgments had to be justified. Pigou spends much of his Theory of Welfare Economics doing precisely that. For example, he writes: "It is fair to suppose that most commodities, especially those of wide consumption that are required, as articles of food and clothing are, for direct personal use, will be wanted as a means to satisfaction…" (Pigou, 1920 His introspective use of utility led him to include two significant interrelated normative judgments in his analysis. First, he held that, in general, income going to rich people had less positive impact on society's welfare than income going to poor people.
Based on this assumption, he could favor policies supporting redistribution from rich to poor if that transfer did not decrease the social dividend. He argued that such transfers "enable more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants." (Pigou, 1920, p. 89 ) Second, he argued that it was inappropriate to differentiate individuals' ability to generate pleasure, thus specifically excluding the argument that the rich needed more money to fulfill their more refined tastes. Tastes, he argued, were changeable, and if the poor were given more income, they would develop more refined tastes.
Pigou did not deny that these aspects of his welfare economics involved very specific normative judgments, but, for him, they were reasonable judgments, shared with a large part of the population. They were also necessary judgments to make the tools relevant for applied policy. Since his was realistic theory, not pure theory, Pigou argued that such judgments were quite acceptable as long as one was clear that they were being made. Given his definition of pure theory, Robbins was very careful to say that no policy conclusions followed from economic theory. In his Ely Lecture (Robbins, 1981 But as was the case with Keynes, Robbins did not stop there; he recognized that his definition of the science of economics was highly limiting and would mean that economics has little, if anything, to say about policy since "all recommendations of policy involve judgments of value." (Robbins, 1981, p. 6 (Robbins, 1981, p. 7, 8) Robbins sees political economy as distinct from economics in the stricter sense of the word. It involves "all modes of analysis and explicit or implicit judgments of value."
Lionel Robbins' Political Economy
While he does not call it the art of economics, Robbins' political economy is an almost perfect parallel to Keynes' art branch of economics. Moreover, if one sees Pigou's realistic economics as a form of Robbins' political economy, not as pure theory, there is little difference between Robbins' and Pigou's view of how policy analysis needs to be conducted in reference to theory. Pigou was simply developing an approach that Keynes and Robbins said needed to be developed, but did not develop, and did not believe deserved to be called economic theory.
Abba Lerner's Economics of Control
The last writer I will consider in the this paper is Abba Lerner, whose Economics of Control (Lerner, 1944) provided a template for the current approach to policy that current textbooks take. Although Lerner was a student of Lionel Robbins (and he specifically states that the ideas were likely absorbed from his teachers at LSE, including
Robbins and Hayek, (Lerner p. viii left open the possibility that his policy conclusions followed from pure economic theory, not from a realistic theory that had already embodied numerous welfare judgments that needed to be discussed and accepted before one could apply the results of the analysis.
The likelihood that people would interpret his work as implying that policy conclusions followed from theory was increased because, unlike Marshall and Pigou who carefully discussed the limitations of theory to drawing policy conclusions, Lerner specifically applied his theories to policy and aggressively related theory to policy conclusions. 11 He made no distinction between precepts (derived from the art of economics embodying value judgments in the theory) and theorems (derived from pure theory, and quite irrelevant for policy). Thus, he argued that while interpersonal comparisons of welfare were impossible, "probable comparisons" were not and that redistribution policy should be based on "probable total satisfaction." (Lerner, 1944, p. 29) Consistent with this view he drew out specific rules for how government could achieve the optimal distribution of income. In macro, Lerner developed the rules of functional finance, which involved the government maintaining "a reasonable level of demand at all times" through appropriate fiscal policy, and a monetary policy governed only by the need to maintain "the optimal amount of investment" and by the functional needs of the economy, not by any precepts of "sound finance." 14 (Lerner 1941) These policy rules that Lerner developed were not presented as general guidelines to be used in combination with non-economic considerations, as were the precepts of Marshall and Pigou. Instead, they were presented as firm rules based on economic theory. seeking to accomplish their own ends, to act in the way which is most beneficial for society as a whole. …Here we shall merely attempt to show what is socially desirable. (Lerner, 1944, p. 6) In making his arguments Lerner combined a much longer chain of reasoning into the purely economic analysis than either Marshall or Pigou had been willing to do.
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Whereas Marshall's work was primarily partial equilibrium in nature, and designed to solve specific policy issues, Lerner drew policy rules from general equilibrium theory, using long chains of reasoning, an approach that Marshall argued against.
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Had Lerner followed J.N. Keynes' approach and seen his work as pure theory, with little relevance for policy, his economics of control approach would have been consistent with that of previous writers. But Lerner did not take that view. He drew very specific rules about policy from theory, as one might do in a Marshallian/Pigovian framework. In doing so he ignored the positive/art distinction of Keynes, the economics/political economy distinction of Robbins, and the fruit-seeking/light seeking distinction of Pigou. In short, he moved away from a "muddling through" vision of applied policy, in which pure theory had no direct relevance for policy, a vision held by all pervious writers, and replaced it with an "economics of control" vision of applied policy, in which specific policy rules followed from pure theory.
Conclusion
I am primarily a teacher of economics. The reason I am interested in the above history is that it sheds light on how we came to the particular structure of micro and micro that currently dominates the texts. That framework remains essentially the framework that Lerner developed, although in macro, with the demise of Keynesian economics, precisely what we are teaching students is unclear. 16 The microeconomic framework that we teach is a framework in which we teach students an applied policy approach where policy conclusions seem to be directly drawn from theory. What this history points out is that our current microeconomic textbook presentation would be unacceptable to Keynes, Marshall, Pigou, and Robbins.
Where and is built on the assumption that governments have resolved these. Unfortunately, such considerations of the necessary element of value judgments in any discussion of policy are not presented in most economics texts, since they do not distinguish a separate "art of economics" branch for policy or make it clear that they are using tools that already embody normative judgments.
All of the economists I have considered, with the possible exception of Lerner, would have a problem with the current textbook microeconomics presentation, because it violates Hume's Dictum-that you cannot derive a should from an is. They all accepted the need to go beyond pure economic theory to have anything to say about policy or the role of the state. For all of them, applied policy, and questions about the role of the state in the economy, is a muddle. For them the role of the economic theorist is not to give answers, but to provide input into a broader policy decision process that goes far beyond economics. That insight has been lost in the texts, and that is sad. maintained (Marshall 1902) . Given his institutional needs, it is not surprising that he combined the art of economics and positive economics, and called it economics rather than political economy. To have emphasized Keynes' distinction would have worked against his desire to set up a separate tripos in economics.
6 Consistent with that view in Principles, he placed all general equilibrium issues in a two-page footnote. (Marshall, 1890 , Mathematical Note XXI) Such theoretical issues could not be dealt with using the mathematical techniques available, and thus were beyond theorizing.
7 For example, he eschewed mathematics, but simultaneously structured his arguments in the Principles so that they could be deduced mathematically. (The mathematics were placed in an appendix if they were included at all.) He incorporated enormous institutional and historical insights into his Principles, but he simultaneously removed the term 'political' from the name of economics discipline, naming his book Principles of Economics rather than Principles of Political Economy. This change in name further moved the profession away from Keynes' methodological perspective because the term "political economy" suggests that there is an applied branch of economic separate from the theoretical branch, and for Marshall that wasn't the case.
